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The Constitutional Right to One's
Good Name: An Examination of the
Scholarship of Mr. Justice Rehnquist
By MARK TusHNET*
I. INTRODUCTION
Mr. Justice Rehnquist has usually been considered an in-
telligent and legally gifted conservative judge. Yet his perform-
ance has not measured up to the expectations that such an
evaluation usually generates. On technical matters, his opin-
ions are impressive,' but his work on most questions of sub-
stance has been little more than adequate. 2 Sometimes the
disparity appears within a single opinion. In Sosna v. Iowa,3 for
example, Justice Rehnquist followed a perceptive analysis of
the problems of mootness in class action litigation with a dis-
cussion of the validity, under the equal protection clause, of
durational residency requirements for divorce that only occa-
sionally reached the level of conclusory assertion and at no
point could be called analytical.
Perhaps the nadir in his work so far, however, is Paul v.
Davis.' His opinion for the Court is riddled with inadequate
attempts to distinguish prior cases and confusions between
constitutional and statutory analysis. Indeed, his characteriza-
tions of several relevant precedents is so strained that even the
gentli'Justice Brennan called him a dissembler.5 In this article,
I hope through a detailed examination of Paul v. Davis to pro-
vide some explanation for the gross disjunction between re-
puted ability and known performance that appears in many of
Justice Rehnquist's opinions for the conservative majority. I
believe that the explanation lies primarily with the institu-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin. B.A., 1967, Harvard Uni-
versity; M.A., J.D., 1971, Yale University.
I See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S.
507 (1973).
2 This is not true of his major opinions on retroactivity in criminal cases. See
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
419 U.S. 393 (1975).
96 S.Ct. 1155 (1976).
1 Id. at 1173.
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tional characteristics of an emerging conservative majority as
yet unwilling to repudiate flatly relatively recent decisions. In
a sense, then, Justice Rehnquist has been driven to inadequate
performance because of his colleagues' reluctance to follow him
where his inclinations and legal ability push him.
The facts in Paul v. Davis are easily recited. The plaintiff,
Edward Davis ITI, a news photographer in Louisville, Kentucky
was arrested in June 1971 for shoplifting, and arraigned in
September. He pleaded not guilty and the case remained open
when, over a year later, police officials preparing an offensive
against shoplifting during the Christmas season circulated a
list of "active shoplifters" including Davis' name and photo-
graph. The list was described as including "subjects known to
be active in this criminal field." Davis, after receiving an ad-
monition from his employer, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, seeking monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief for
an alleged deprivation of property or liberty without due pro-
cess. The Supreme Court, interpreting the complaint to rest
solely upon a claim of defamation-the false imputation of
criminality-held that the suit was correctly dismissed by the
district court for failure to state a federal claim.
II. STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
Justice Rehnquist prefaced his opinion by noting what he
considered the untoward consequences of finding that the
plaintiff had stated a claim that could survive a motion to
dismiss.6 Announcements that a person had been arrested, mis-
taken shootings of bystanders, injuries inflicted in ordinary
automobile accidents involving government cars-all these
would "almost necessarily" give rise to actions cognizable in
federal courts, he said.7 Justice Rehnquist thought this could
not have been contemplated by the framers of the fourteenth
amendment.
To support his contention that the plaintiff's argument
would lead to a disruption of settled conceptions of federalism,
Justice Rehnquist relied on Greenwood v. Peacock8 and Screws
I Id. at 1159.
7Id.
8 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
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v. United States,9 both of which involved "not wholly dissimi-
lar question[s]"' 0 relating to statutes adopted during the same
period of reconstruction as § 1983. In Greenwood, the Court
refrained from what it characterized as a strained interpreta-
tion of the statute allowing removal to federal court of criminal
prosecutions instituted in state courts where the defendants
had raised certain civil rights claims. That opinion construed
the statutory language "denied or cannot enforce in the court
of [the] State a right under any law providing for the equal
civil rights of citizens" to allow removal only of those cases
where the law providing for equal civil rights conferred an im-
munity from prosecution. Similarly, in Screws the Court held
that the statute making it a crime to deprive individuals of
rights secured by the Constitution applied only where the act
was willful, that is, done with the specific intention of depriv-
ing the victim of rights known to be protected by the Constitu-
tion.
Greenwood and Screws demonstrate the Court's reluct-
ance to pursue statutory language to the limits permitted by
the strict sense of the words used, because of the implications
of such constructions for a healthy federalism. They provide
only weak support for the decision in Paul, however, since that
case involved constitutional interpretation. Narrow construc-
tion of statutes may be appropriate because we should not
readily assume that even Reconstruction Congresses intended
to alter the federal system radically. The fourteenth amend-
ment, however, was designed to do exactly that, and everyone
knew it. Thus, the proper way to decide Paul, for a Court bent
on limiting the number of situations in which federal courts
might displace state courts, would have been to construe § 1983
to extend only to a subclass of all constitutionally guaranteed
rights" as other statutes were construed in Greenwood and
Screws. 1
1 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
96 S.Ct. at 1159.
"In Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1131 (7th Cir. 1975), the court, through then-
Judge Stevens, held that § 1983 relief was not available for claims predicated on
negligence where the state provided adequate post-deprivation remedies in its ordinary
tort system, because the post-taking remedies afforded sufficient due process. Judge
Fairchild, concurring, would have interpreted § 1983 to exclude negligent deprivations
of property from its scope.
12 There are indications in the Court's opinion in Paul that it was misled by
19761
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Indeed, Screws suggests a way to dispose of at least two of
the hypothetical situations posed by Justice Rehnquist.'" First,
one could easily read § 1983 as extending solely to intentional,
or grossly negligent, deprivations of constitutional rights. An
action would therefore not lie when someone was "negligently
killed by a sheriff driving a government vehicle."' 4 Another
construction could exclude the doctrine of transferred inteit
derived from tort law to deny recovery to bystanders injured by
intentional acts directed at others. Justice Rehnquist's second
hypothetical, the dissemination of the fact of an arrest, and
Paul itself require a different analysis. Here the court could
have interpreted the statute to afford a privilege 5 for the dis-
semination of accurate information derived from public re-
cords. 6 Thus, even if one were inclined to throw Paul v. Davis
out of federal court, there were ways to do so that were more
consistent with the cases upon which the Court relied.
Several concluding remarks are appropriate here. First, as
a general matter, statutory interpretation should be a route to
decision preferred over constitutional interpretation since sta-
tutory interpretation leaves open the possibility that Congress
excessive arguments of counsel. See, e.g., 96 S.Ct. at 1159.
'3 See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
14 96 S.Ct. at 1159.
" Other privileges have been judicially incorporated into § 1983. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 96 S.Ct. 984 (1976), and cases cited therein.
,1 This approach would have preserved most of the recent cases cited by Justice
Brennan in dissent, 96 S.Ct. at 71-77 n.18, holding that in cases involving federal
officials and not arising under § 1983, the Constitution protects against the unwar-
ranted dissemination of arrest records.
Justice Rehnquist's hypothetical of the immediate dissemination of the fact of an
arrest differs from the facts of Paul, where the plaintiff was described as an "active"
shoplifter on the basis of a year-old arrest. This distinction is another reason for
rejecting the anticipated consequence of a finding for the plaintiff in Paul.
Ordinarily the privilege would not lead to dismissal for failure to state a federal
claim but to summary judgment for the defendant. It is true that in a technical sense
federal courts would have jurisdiction over a greater range of cases, but if nearly all of
those cases can be dismissed at early stages, it is hard to see how traditional notions
of federalism are offended; ordinarily federalism concerns would arise from federal
judgments issued against state officials, or from the subjection of state officials to
extended litigation in the federal courts, not simply from the assumption of federal
jurisdiction.
Actually, it might often occur, as in Paul, that the privilege would appear on the
face of the complaint, so that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted would be proper. See 1 MooRE's MANUAL § 11.06[1] (1972
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might revise § 1983 to provide the relief sought, and that relief
might be available under circumstances where the concerns of
federalism would not be so strong. Second, even if a privilege
under § 1983 were available in Paul, a court might at some time
have to decide whether a similar claim could be made under
the general federal question jurisdiction as directly arising
under the Constitution. 7 In Paul itself, the Court stated that
jurisdiction was claimed under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) so that no
jurisdictional amount was alleged."8 Finally, in an action di-
rectly arising under the Constitution, the central question
would be whether one is constitutionally protected against the
dissemination of the fact of an arrest. 9 That question was
raised in Paul, too, and the Court disposed of it in an appar-
ently irresponsible manner, saying only that "[n]one of our
substantive privacy decisions hold this or anything like this,
and we decline to enlarge them in this manner.""0 In light of a
developing line of lower court cases which primarily involved
federal officials where concerns of federalism would be irrele-
vant, and which gave reasoned justifications for finding protec-
tion from the dissemination of arrest records in the Supreme
Court's privacy decisions,2' the process of principled adjudica-
tion demanded more than such a cursory disposition.
H1. THE SCOPE OF PROPERTY UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE
In Paul the plaintiff claimed that he'was deprived of lib-
erty and property when the police publicly labelled him an
"active" shoplifter without giving him an opportunity to rebut
that label. Thus, he had to establish that his interest in his
good name was a form of liberty or property protected by the
fourteenth amendment. Several recent cases in the Supreme
,7 See District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
,1 The Court has indicated that when a jurisdictional defect arises because of the
Court's own decision, it will remand to allow the complaint to be amended. Kenosha
v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973).
" The existence of such a right need not, of course, raise a federal question, for
Congress need not provide a federal forum for the vindication of constitutional rights.
See generally HART & WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 330-
60 (2d ed. 1973).
96 S.Ct. at 1166.
2, See cases collected in Justice Brennan's dissent at 96 S.Ct. at 1177 n. 18.
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Court seemed to indicate that it was, and Justice Rehnquist
strove to distinguish them. His enterprise was not a happy one,
for distinguishing the cases was apparently impossible, and the
opinion drew lines that cannot reasonably be defended.
A. Wisconsin v. Constantineau Distinguished
The first of the recent cases is Wisconsin v. Constanti-
neau,2 12 which invalidated a state statute authorizing govern-
ment officials to "post" in retail liquor establishments the
names of excessive drinkers. One consequence of posting was
denial of access to liquor, for bartenders could be punished
for selling to persons whose names had been posted. Another
consequence, more emphasized by the Court, was injury to
reputation. In Paul, Justice Rehnquist read Constantineau to
rest upon the fact that posting "deprived the individual of a
right previously held under state law-the right to purchase or
obtain liquor in common with the rest of the community."
'
This analysis of Constantineau is not inaccurate but, with-
out more, does not help to distinguish it from Paul v. Davis.
Either the state has a discretionary power to confer a right to
one's good name by adopting defamation laws, or it has the
obligation to do so.21 If it is a discretionary power, as in
Constantineau, the selective withdrawal of the right is a depr-
vation requiring due process. If creation of the right is constitu-
tionally mandated, its denial must be accomplished according
to constitutional standards. Either alternative leads to the con-
clusion that the plaintiff in Paul v. Davis had stated a claim
arising under the Constitution.
Something more is needed, and Justice Rehnquist pro-
vided some clues in saying that in Constantineau "it was that
alteration of legal status which, 'combined with the injury re-
sulting from the defamation,' justified the invocation of proce-
22 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
21 96 S.Ct. at 1164.
24 Logically, there is a third possibility. The state could be prohibited from adopt-
ing defamation laws, but that is clearly inconsistent with a modem understanding of
the Constitution. Because Kentucky has a law of defamation, the only relevant ques-
tion is whether that law was adopted because of constitutional command or because
it was a choice available to Kentucky. See Cox, Torts-Right of Privacy in Kentucky,
38 Ky. L.J. 487 (1960).
[Vol. 64
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dural safeguards."25 Justice Rehnquist seized this language
from Board of Regents v. Roth 6 to explain the distinction used
to preserve the result in Constantineau. Roth was an untenured
college professor whose probationary contract was not renewed,
and the Court held that the failure to renew, standing alone,
did not require procedural protections, not even a statement of
reasons for the nonrenewal. It indicated, though, that a failure
to renew based on reasons injurious to Roth's reputation would
give rise to a requirement of fuller procedural protection.27 In
Paul, Justice Rehnquist interpreted Roth as requiring two ele-
ments, failure to rehire and stigmatization, both of which must
conjoin to require procedural guarantees, though neither alone
would do so. Similarly, in Constantineau the denial of access
to liquor together with the impact on reputation required pro-
cedural due process. In Paul, however, the plaintiff alleged only
damage to reputation. This, thought Justice Rehnquist, distin-
guished Paul from Roth and Constantineau.
It is true that the cases can be read that way without
distorting terribly the language of the opinions. But legal rea-
soning involves more than finding linguistic hooks upon which
to distinguish cases. It is important to know not only how cases
may be interpreted but how they were intended. For example,
Justice Brennan's dissent in Paul fit the dual emphasis of Roth
and Constantineau into a sensible conceptual framework, argu-
ing that the failure to rehire and the denial of access to liquor
were state actions and the stigmatization was a deprivation of
property.2
But Justice Rehnquist provided no such framework for his
interpretations. He discussed them in terms of federalism, thus
understandably interpreting the cases narrowly, but not suffi-
ciently explaining Roth and Constantineau. Indeed, there ap-
pears to be no analysis that could do so. In fact, the analytic
structure of Roth, aside from its particular language, shows
that the plaintiff in Paul necessarily stated a federal claim, and
it is at the analytic level, not the linguistic one, that legal
distinctions must operate.
21 96 S.Ct. at 1164.
26 408 U.S. 564 (1974).
21 Id. at 573.
96 S.Ct. at 1175-76 n.15.
19761
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B. Board of Regents v. Roth Undistinguished
Roth should have been troublesome for Justice Rehnquist
in another way. Aside from the strong indications that had the
reasons for Roth's nonrenewal been discrediting, he would have
stated a federal claim, the Roth opinion developed a novel
framework for analyzing claims that property had been taken
without due process. 2 The Court's premise was that property
rights are defined by state law and that only when some state-
defined property right is taken do the procedural requirements
of the fourteenth amendment attach. But applying that prem-
ise to the problem in Paul, it is clear that the plaintiff stated a
claim. For Kentucky, as Justice Rehnquist noted, surely had
created a property right in the plaintiff's good name.3 1 When
that right is taken by state officials, Roth would require proce-
dural due process.
This aspect of Roth went almost unmentioned by Justice
Rehnquist, in other cases an enthusiast of the Roth approach.
For example, in Arnett v. Kennedy,3' he argued that because
property rights are defined by state law, the procedural protec-
tions provided by state law set the extent of the property right;
procedural due process can therefore require no more than
what state law makes available.32 A similar maneuver might
have helped a bit in Paul. Justice Rehnquist might have said
that the plaintiffs right to his good name under Kentucky law
was limited by the defenses available to the police officials.
The effect would be to make state law defenses applicable in
§ 1983 actions. Three obstacles prevent this approach. First,
although the plaintiff would not gain the benefit of any sub-
stantive federal law by filing a § 1983 action, he would have a
right to a federal forum, and it was this kind of transfer of
jurisdiction from state to federal courts that Justice Rehnqu-
ist's citation of Greenwood v. Peacock was designed to depre-
cate. Second, only two members of the Court agreed with Jus-
21 The framework is discussed in more detail in Tushnet, The Newer Property:
Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 Sup. CT. REv. 261.
30 96 S.Ct. at 1159. The "complaint would appear to state a classical claim for
defamation actionable in the courts of virtually every state."
" 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
32 Id. Arnett actually involves federal statutory law but that can make no differ-
ence in this context. See Tushnet, supra n. 29 at 262 n. 6.
[Vol. 64
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tice Rehnquist in Arnett.3 3 Finally, it would vitiate Monroe v.
Pape,"4 the decision making the statutory liability under § 1983
coextensive with state law liability, for Monroe was designed
for situations where the state law remedy was inadequate, or
"though available in theory,35 was not available in practice.
'36
As Justice Harlan noted in concurring in Monroe, the structure
of defenses and damage rules under state law provides one
basis for concluding that the state law remedy is inadequate or
unavailable.
3 1
Echoes of Roth and Arnett occur in a brief section of Jus-
tice Rehnquist's opinion. After reciting the two factor analysis
of Roth, the opinion concludes:
Kentucky law does not extend to respondent any legal guar-
antee of present enjoyment of reputation which has been al-
tered as a result of petitioners' actions. Rather his interest in
reputation is simply one of a number which the State may
protect against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a
forum for the vindication of those interests by means of dam-
ages actions.
To some extent, this is yet another restatement, albeit cryptic,
of the basic argument in an opinion characterized by argument
from emphatic assertion-the more frequently and forcefully
one says something, the more persuasive it is supposed to be-
3 Bishop v. Wood, 96 S.Ct. 2074 (1976), is a sequel to Amett and Paul v. Davis,
but it adds little to the analysis because it turns on a peculiar interpretation of state
law. Bishop was a police officer who was dismissed without a pre-termination hearing.
He was designated a permanent employee in the city's ordinances, which, however,
provided only for a statement of reasons for the dismissal. The federal trial court
interpreted the ordinance as creating only an employment at will, primarily because
the ordinance did not provide for pre-termination hearings. Id. at 2078 n.9. This seems
a strange way to construe the ordinance, but it is simply a matter of state law. No
federal constitutional barrier precludes a state from saying that statutes lacking proce-
dural protections create employment at will. Thus, it follows directly from Roth that
no pre-termination hearing is required. The analysis is this: 1) The ordinance has no
procedural guarantees; 2) as a matter of state law, such an ordinance creates an
employment at will; 3) as a matter of federal law, no procedural guarantees are re-
quired. While this initially appears to be circular, it is not, because the second step is
not compelled, and even the majority in Bishop regarded the construction of the
ordinance as odd. Id. at 2078-79.
34 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
21 Id. at 173.
3 Id. at 174.
" Id. at 196 n. 5. See also 96 S.Ct. at 1167 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 96 S.Ct. at 1166.
1976]
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come.39 If the statement is designed to add something to the
argument, though, what it adds is obscure. In place of the
traditionally disfavored right without a remedy, here there is
apparently a remedy without a right, a damage action to make
reparation for activities that "worked [no] change in the
[plaintiff's] status as theretofore recognized under the State's
laws."40
The only apparent escape from Roth would be to hold that
the Roth-type analysis is appropriate for some kinds of prop-
erty claims, and that some other analysis, premised not on
state law but directly on the Constitution, is appropriate for
other kinds of property claims. There is some authority for this
course. Goss v. Lopez4' involved high school students who had
been suspended from school because of their participation in a
racial disturbance. The Court held that the due process re-
quirements of notice and an opportunity to be heard attached
for two reasons. First, Ohio statutes guaranteed the students
the right to attend school, a right the Court characterized as a
property right which could not be taken without due process.
Second, the students had an independent interest, which the
Court characterized as a liberty interest, in their reputations,
and that interest too could not be taken without due process.
As Justice Brennan's dissent pointed out, the majority in Paul
ignored the careful distinction drawn in Goss between these
two grounds and treated the liberty interest in Goss as but-
tressed by the statutory guarantees, thus squeezing the case
into the two factor analysis.42 The way the Paul Court handled
Goss was incredibly disingenuous. More important for present
purposes, it blurred the possibility suggested by Goss that
property interests are identified by looking to state law while
liberty interests arise from the Constitution.43 In Paul, for ex-
ample, there is a state-defined property right that Justice
Rehnquist ignored. If Paul does not repudiate Roth, the Court's
analysis in Paul depends upon a distinction between the prop-
3, See, e.g., id. at 1165 (Paul is "quite consistent" with Goss v. Lopez).
I d. at 1166.
419 U.S. 565 (1975).
, 96 S.Ct. at 1175 n. 15 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
,3 See also Montanye v. Haymes, 96 S.Ct. 2543 (1976) (state prisoner could not
complain of transfer to another institution for circulating "legal petition" where state
law guaranteed no right to remain at particular institution).
[Vol. 64
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erty interest in Paul and that in Roth. Paul v. Davis, that is,
might be seen as drawing a line within the class of property
interests, so that Roth-type property interests are derived from
state law while Paul-type property interests are derived di-
rectly from the Constitution.
Such an approach thus requires distinguishing among
property rights for purposes of deciding what kind of constitu-
tional analysis is to be used. One commentator has suggested
that the line is located between traditional property and "new
property," i.e., between interests like reputation, primarily
protected until recently by the common law, and interests like
tenure, primarily protected by recent statutory developments."
Justification of this distinction, however, is hard to come by.
There is liberty and traditional property, including Paul, on
one side, and new property on the other. For the former class,
constitutional analysis controls; for the latter, state law con-
trols. Perhaps, since a federal remedy is involved, federalism
is a justification. It may be that federal courts have had enough
experience with liberty and traditional property claims for
them to be confident that any defects in procedure are unjusti-
fied. But in cases involving new property, the social sense of
what procedures are desirable is much less settled, so that we
should tolerate variations among the states, our Brandeisian
laboratories of social experimentation.
This analysis might distinguish Paul and Roth, albeit
rather weakly. Aside from that, it has little to commend it. In
part, the difficulty is that the federalism rationale is counter-
intuitive. It might be reasonable to defer to state law for rela-
tively unimportant property interests but to insist on constitu-
tional protection for important ones, and yet the distinction
between traditional and new property does not correspond to a
distinction based on importance. Also, there is no reason to
think that Justice Rehnquist or his concurring brethren had
that argument in mind in deciding Paul.
IV. CONSERVATISM AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSERVATISM
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Paul v. Davis is seriously
flawed. It is flawed on the surface because the asserted distinc-
" Note, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 86 n.26 (1974).
1976]
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tions between cases are utterly unpersuasive. It is flawed at
deeper levels because the potential distinctions between the
cases are scarcely alluded to and because such distinctions
would require far too complex an analytic structure for support.
In light of Justice Rehnquist's reputed ability, these flaws beg
for explanation.
The explanation, I think, begins with three obvious facts.
First, Paul was a hard case in that recent cases like Roth and
Constantineau strongly pointed toward a conclusion that the
members of the majority desired to reject. Second, the Chief
Justice, when he is in the majority, decides which member of
the majority will write the opinion of the court. Finally, it was
essential to secure Justice Stewart's vote if a majority was to
be assembled for the ultimate result in Paul, because Justice
White dissented.
Thus, the Chief Justice chose Justice Rehnquist to write
what must have appeared to be a most difficult opinion, some-
thing that has happened before.15 Justice Rehnquist's challenge
was to write an opinion that would satisfy Justice Stewart. One
way of cementing a wavering Justice's vote is to cite approv-
ingly that Justice's opinions, no matter how tangential they are
to the case at hand. Arguably, that is why Greenwood v.
Peacock was cited at the outset of Justice Rehnquist's opinion,
for the case contributed little to the argument and indeed inter-
rupted its flow.
There was a greater problem, however, for Justice Rehn-
quist chose not to repudiate the suggestions in prior cases that
stigmatization gave rise to a constitutional injury. Instead, he
strove mightily, and unsuccessfully, to distinguish the cases
away. Here too the need to secure Justice Stewart's vote surely
played a part. First, Justice Stewart had been a member of the
majority in most of those cases, and, indeed, wrote the Court's
opinion in Roth. More important, however, was the recent vin-
tage of Constantineau and Roth. Justice Stewart is an institu-
tional conservative. As such, he believes it important to avoid
abrupt shifts in doctrine unless they are attributable to diffi-
culties that arose when courts attempted to apply the doctrine;
it will not do for such shifts to appear to be only the result of
'5 See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
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changes in the membership of the Supreme Court. Such
changes make the Court look much less like an institution of
law and more like an ordinary political body. Repudiating
Constantineau would have been inconsistent with institutional
conservatism though wholly consistent with political conserva-
tism. Distinguishing it by ordinary legal argument, however,
would suggest not that the Court had changed, but only that
the cases were different.
Perhaps the nicest example of Justice Stewart's institu-
tional conservatism is his opinion for the Court in Hudgens v.
National Labor Relations Board." In 1968 the Supreme Court
held, in Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza,4" that the first amendment barred state courts from en-
joining peaceful picketing at a privately-owned shopping cen-
ter. Four years later, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner,8 with the votes
of the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Blackmun shifting the
balance, the Court distinguished Logan Valley Plaza by look-
ing to its precise facts, and held that a shopping center could
invoke state authority in aid of its ban on distributing antiwar
handbills." Justice Stewart, who had joined the majority in
Logan Valley Plaza, joined Justice Marshall's dissent, which
noted that the change in result was fundamentally rooted in
the change in the Court's membership." After another 4 years
had passed, the Court decided Hudgens, and this time Justice
Stewart changed sides, writing for the Court that the first
amendment was totally irrelevant to the question of picketing
on private property, home, or shopping center, and therefore
overruling Logan Valley Plaza. Justice Stewart said that, while
Lloyd purported to distinguish Logan Valley Plaza, the analy-
sis of the later case was inconsistent with the premises of the
earlier one. Thus, it was not Hudgens that overruled Logan
Valley Plaza; Lloyd Corp. had done so without telling anyone.
Perhaps Justice Stewart was twitting Justice Powell, who had
written Lloyd, for a lack of candor that Justice Powell rather
sheepishly admitted in Hudgens.5' But Justice Stewart's posi-
46 96 S.Ct. 1029 (1976).
' 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
" 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
I /d.
Id. at 584 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
96 S.Ct. at 1039 (Powell, J., concurring).
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tion was also that of an institutional conservative, because he
could acknowledge that asserted distinctions among cases were
unpersuasive and still take comfort in the fact that he had not
participated in overruling a recent decision.
Finally, Justice Stewart's biting dissent in Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co.,52 expressly rejected such a recent overruling
of his opinion for the Court in Fuentes v. Shevin.53 In Mitchell,
he declared flatly:
No data have been brought to our attention to indicate that
these decisions [which followed Fuentes] granting to other-
wise defenseless consumers the simple rudiments of due pro-
cess of law, have worked any untoward change in the con-
sumer credit market or in other commercial relationships.
The only perceivable change that has occurred since Fuentes
is in the makeup of this Court."
Because of Justice Stewart's institutional conservatism, he
probably would not have joined an opinion expressly repudiat-
ing Roth or Constantineau. Justice Rehnquist was forced to
distinguish those cases, and that could not be done without
developing the kind of comprehensive analysis that might dis-
courage his more timid colleagues.
The explanation for Justice Rehnquist's inadequate per-
formance in Paul thus probably does not lie in any intellectual
failings on his part. It lies instead in the problems of assem-
bling a majority for a conservative result which actually re-
quired overruling prior cases. That majority could not be as-
sembled in an honest opinion, but we can hardly blame Justice
Rehnquist for that. He operates within an institution requiring
such an approach.
52 416 U.S. 600, 629 (1974).
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
416 U.S. at 635.
[Vol. 64
